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MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S NARROWED 
DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
Mikala Noe* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 17, 1972, five men were caught attempting to bug the offices of the 
Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C.1 
The first link between this break-in and President Richard Nixon’s re-election 
campaign funds was discovered when a $25,000 cashier’s check, earmarked for 
Nixon’s re-election fund, was found to have been deposited into the bank account 
of one of the men involved in the break-in.2  Shortly thereafter, reporters revealed 
that then U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell controlled a secret campaign fund 
used to gather information about the Democratic Party.3  During the resulting 
Watergate investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation “established that 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in Nixon campaign contributions had been set 
aside to pay for an extensive undercover campaign aimed at discrediting individual 
Democratic presidential candidates and disrupting their campaigns.”4  Nearly one 
year after the Watergate break-in, President Nixon accepted the responsibility of 
the actions taken by his subordinates and appointed a new Attorney General, 
recommending changes in the law “to prevent future campaign abuses of the sort 
recently uncovered,” referring to the secret election funds.5  On August 8, 1974, 
President Nixon formally announced his resignation.6  The Watergate scandal 
                                                                                                     
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author is grateful to Dmitry 
Bam and Zachary Heiden for their invaluable insight into the world of campaign finance, and to her 
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 1. Alfred Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (June 18, 1972), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html 
(reportedly the third break-in to the Democratic National Committee’s offices). 
 2. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 
1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bug-suspect-got-campaign-funds/2012/06/06/ 
gJQAyTjKJV_story.html. 
 3. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Mitchell Controlled Secret GOP Fund, WASH. POST (Sept. 
29, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitchell-controlled-secret-gop-fund/2012/06/06/ 
gJQAOcAKJV_story.html. 
 4. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotaged-democrats/ 
2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html. 
 5. Laurence Stern & Haynes Johnson, 3 Top Nixon Aides, Kleindienst Out; President Accepts Full 
Responsibi l i ty;  Richardson  Wil l  Conduct  New Probe ,  WAS H. PO ST (May 1,  1973), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/3-top-nixon-aides-kleindienst-out-president-accepts-full- 
responsibility-richardson-will-conduct-new-probe/2012/06/04/gJQAx7oFJV_story.html.  
 6. Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Resignation Speech (Aug. 8, 1974), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/links/nixon_speech.html. 
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served as “the impetus for the last wave of campaign finance reform.”7   
The dictionary definition of corruption includes: “dishonest or illegal behavior 
especially by powerful people”;8 “dishonest proceedings”; “bribery”; “perversion 
of integrity”; “depravity”;9 and “a vicious and fraudulent intention to evade the 
prohibitions of the law.”10  The Supreme Court once subscribed to this very broad 
definition of corruption.11  However, over time, the Court has adapted a narrower 
view of corruption.  Instead of corruption including all dishonest or illegal behavior 
and a fraudulent intention to evade the law, today’s Supreme Court defines 
corruption solely as quid pro quo.12   Quid pro quo corruption is the trading of one 
thing for another; in campaign finance, it’s often the trading of money to be used to 
get the candidate into office (through campaign contributions) in exchange for a 
benefit after the candidate takes office.13  As the definition of corruption has 
become narrower, the Supreme Court has begun to overturn campaign finance 
laws, finding that the laws are not tailored closely enough to the purpose of 
preventing this type of corruption. 
On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court overturned a portion of campaign finance 
law.  The Supreme Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,14 held 
that aggregate limits on political campaign contributions “intrude without 
justification on a citizen’s ability to exercise ‘the most fundamental First 
Amendment activities.’”15  Aggregate limits were created by the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971,16 and later amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act in 2002.17  These aggregate limits provided that a single person could donate 
up to a certain fixed amount every two years to political campaigns and 
committees.18  Contrary to aggregate contribution limits that govern how much a 
person can donate to all candidates or committees, individual contribution limits 
restrict how much money a person can donate to a single candidate or committee.19  
Congress created aggregate limits to prevent evasion of other campaign finance 
contribution laws, including individual limits, and to further the government’s anti-
corruption interest.20  
Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC) brought 
                                                                                                     
 7. Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft Money System, 24 
J. LEGIS. 167, 167 (1998). 
 8. Corruption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption.  
 9. Corruption, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/corruption?s=t. 
 10. Corruption, Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (11th ed. 2004). 
 11. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 12. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 13. Robert Barnes, The High Court: When is a campaign contribution a bribe?, WASH. POST (Aug. 
12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-high-court-when-is-a-campaign-contribution-a-
bribe/2012/08/12/68cdd94e-e2f9-11e1-a25e-15067bb31849_story.html. 
 14. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460. 
 15. Id. at 1462 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).  
 16. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub.L. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as 
2 U.S.C.A. § 431). 
 17. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), PL 107–155, 116 Stat 81 (2002). 
 18. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 19. Id. at 1442. 
 20. Id. 
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the challenge against restrictions in campaign finance contribution law.21   
McCutcheon was a frequent contributor to political campaigns but due to the 
aggregate limits, was unable to contribute to as many candidates as he wished.22   
Additionally, the RNC wished to receive as many contributions as McCutcheon 
wanted to make but could not due to the same aggregate limit.23   Both appellants 
argued that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions violated their First 
Amendment rights.24  In McCutcheon, the Court focused on a narrow definition of 
corruption to determine that the Government’s interest in preventing corruption and 
the appearance of corruption did not outweigh a person’s First Amendment right to 
contribute to political campaigns, and thus removed aggregate limits from 
campaign finance law.25 
McCutcheon is met with a sharply divided audience.  Some characterize the 
Supreme Court’s holding as “obvious common sense,”26 others, as “a devastating 
blow to our democratic system.”27  This Note begins in Part II by briefly examining 
the complex history of campaign finance reform, the movement to analyze 
restrictions on contributions and expenditures under the First Amendment’s 
freedom of expression, and the Supreme Court’s shifting definition of corruption.  
Part III examines the facts and procedural background of McCutcheon, in 
particular, the Supreme Court’s approach to defining corruption in campaign 
financing.  Part IV will suggest the impact this decision will have on political 
campaigns.  This Note contends that the Government’s justifications for enacting 
the aggregate limits were sufficient for the Court to uphold the limitation.  This 
Note further contends that the Supreme Court maintains an unreasonably narrow 
definition of corruption in campaign finance laws.  The U.S. Congress should act 
and pass a law to overturn the Supreme Court’s troubling narrow quid pro quo 
definition of corruption to protect the anti-corruption interests in American 
democracy. 
II.  A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
A.  The Early History of Campaign Finance Reform 
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt listed his first item of congressional 
business as creating “a law prohibiting political contributions by corporations.”28   
This request came after Roosevelt’s election garnered a “‘popular feeling . . . that 
aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of 
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. at 1443. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1462. 
 26. Ashby Jones, Legal Experts React to Supreme Court’s Campaign-Finance Ruling, Blog, WALL 
ST. J. (April 2, 2014 12:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/04/02/legal-experts-react-to-supreme-
courts-campaign-finance-ruling/ (quoting Bradley Smith, former Federal Election Commissioner and 
current law professor at Capital University). 
 27. Id. (quoting Robert Weissman, president of Public Citizen). 
 28. United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW-
CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957). 
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corruption.’”29  The idea was to prevent the wealthy from using corporate funds to 
send candidates to the legislature who in turn would protect and advance the 
interests of the wealthy.30  In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act to address this 
concern.31  The Tillman Act was “the first concrete manifestation of a continuing 
congressional concern for elections ‘free from the power of money.’”32  Shortly 
after its passage, the Act was amended to require the disclosure of House and 
Senate race campaign contributions.33 
Then, in 1925, Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).34  
The FCPA was “limited to general election activities and required the disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures by candidates and political action committees 
(PACs).”35  In debating this Act, Senator Robinson stated that, 
Many believe that when an individual or association of individuals makes large 
contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of political parties in winning 
the elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least, 
receive, consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not 
infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. It is unquestionably an evil 
which ought to be dealt with, and dealt with intelligently and effectively.36  
The first individuals charged with violating the Act were two members of a 
political election committee, Ada L. Burroughs and James Cannon, Jr.37  In 1932, 
Burroughs, acting as treasurer, “accepted contributions and made expenditures for 
the purpose of influencing and attempting to influence the election of presidential 
and vice presidential electors in two states.”38  Burroughs was alleged to have 
violated the FCPA by failing to report the names and addresses of contributors, 
with the amount and date of each contribution.39  In defending himself, Burroughs 
argued that the sections of the Act relating to presidential electors were 
unconstitutional because they sought to regulate “political activities pertaining to 
the appointment of the electors,” a power that is conferred solely upon the state.40   
In Burroughs v. United States,41 the Supreme Court held that Congress has the 
                                                                                                     
 29. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (quoting United States v. Auto. 
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)).  
 30. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 571 (quoting the statement made by Rep. Elihu Root) (“The idea is to 
prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to 
send members of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement 
of their interests as against those of the public.”), hearing before the H. Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong. 
12 (1905). 
 31. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
 32. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 575. 
 33. Publicity Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910) (repealed 1925). 
 34. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Ch. 368, §§ 302, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925) 
(repealed 1971). 
 35. Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: 
Look Who’s Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 358 (1995). 
 36. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 576-77 (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 9507—9508 (1925)). 
 37. United States v. Burroughs, 65 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1933) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934). 
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power to pass laws that are “essential to preserve the departments and institutions 
of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by 
force or by corruption.”42  Focusing on the corruptive effect of money in politics, 
the Supreme Court determined that Congress “reached the conclusion that public 
disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and 
other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.”43  
The Court recognized that the Act sought to “preserve the purity of presidential and 
vice presidential elections.”44  “To say that Congress is without power to pass 
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of 
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power 
of self-protection.”45 
The Hatch Act Amendments of 1940 imposed the first yearly limit on 
individual contributions to federal candidates and national party committees for 
officers and employees of the government.46  Section 13(a) made it unlawful for 
any person to contribute more than $5,000 during a calendar year to any campaign 
or national committee.47  In 1943, Congress took it a step further and passed the 
Smith-Connally Act, prohibiting “labor organizations from making contributions in 
connect[ion] with federal elections.”48  Congress hoped the Smith-Connally Act 
would reduce the undue influence of labor on elections.49  However, after the 1944 
presidential election, Congress recognized a loophole in existing law that confined 
the definition of contribution so that it could be read to apply to only direct gifts or 
payments, not expenditures made by labor organizations on behalf of candidates.50  
Acknowledging the loophole, and further amending part of the FCPA, Congress 
passed the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 making it unlawful for any 
national bank or organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection 
with any election for political office.51     
Two cases were brought before the Court challenging the Labor Management 
Relations Act.  In United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,52 the 
Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended the Labor Management 
Relations Act to destroy “the influence over elections which corporations exercised 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 545. 
 43. Id. at 548. 
 44. Id. at 544. 
 45. Id. at 545. 
 46. Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767, ch. 640, §13(a) (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 594, 
595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605 (2014)). 
 47. Id. (“It shall be unlawful, for any person, directly or indirectly, to make contributions in an 
aggregate amount in excess of $5,000, during any calendar year, or in connection with any campaign for 
nomination or election, to or on behalf of any candidate for an elective Federal office . . . or to or on 
behalf of any committee or other organization engaged in furthering, advancing, or advocating the 
nomination or election of any candidate for any such officer or the success of any national political 
party.”) 
 48. Comment, Regulation of Labor’s Political Contributions and Expenditures: the British and 
American Experience, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 371, 373 (1952). 
 49. Id. 
 50. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948). 
 51. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 149 § 313. 
 52. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. at 106. 
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through financial contribution.”53  Then, in United States v. International Union 
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
(UAW-CIO),54 the Supreme Court held that the use of union dues to create a 
television commercial designed to influence Congressional elections violated the 
FCPA.55  In so holding, the Court recognized Congress’s intent in passing the 
Labor Management Relations Act as one “to protect the political process from what 
it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated 
power.”56 These two early cases demonstrate Congress’s concern for money in 
politics and the possible corruptive effect it presents. 
The next major campaign finance law was not passed until 1971.  The Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)57 repealed the FCPA.58  FECA set out 
guidelines for campaign communications,59 placed limitations on contributions and 
expenditures,60 and required the disclosure of campaign contributions.61 Then came 
Watergate.  Public cynicism about the campaign finance process resulted from 
shady government decisions benefitting large contributors.62  For example, the 
Nixon campaign received more than $1.7 million in campaign contributions from 
people who were later appointed to be ambassadors.63   
In 1974, following the campaign finance law violations by President Richard 
Nixon, Congress passed amendments to FECA.64  These amendments “placed 
limits on the amounts that individuals could contribute to candidates and political 
committees and limited spending by candidates in federal elections.”65  These 
limitations included: 
A $1,000 limit on individuals donating to a candidate for federal office, limiting 
the donation of Political Action Committees (PACs) to $5,000 per election, 
limiting donations to national committees of political parties to $20,000 a year for 
individuals and $15,000 a year for PACs, and an aggregate cap of $25,000 a year 
on the amount an individual could contribute to all federal candidates, national 
parties, and PACs.66   
The aggregate caps were meant to close loopholes in previous laws allowing 
candidates to “use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 113. 
 54. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 588 (1957). 
 55. Id. at 567. 
 56. Id. at 582. 
 57. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub.L. 92–225, Feb. 7, 1972, 86 Stat. 3 
(codified as 2 U.S.C.A. §431) (hereinafter FECA). 
 58. See Burke, supra note 35, at 359. 
 59. FECA, Title 1, § 101. 
 60. Id. at Title 2, § 608. 
 61. Id. at Title 3, § 302. 
 62. Simon, supra note 7, at 168. For a more in-depth review of such practices, see Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, How Much Is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to A Strong Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and A Weak Federal Election Campaign Act, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 71, 71-94 (2012). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 Organizations: Closing the Soft Money Loophole 
Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 817-18 (2006). 
 65. Id. at 818. 
 66. Id. 
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purposes.”67  The FECA Amendments went into effect on October 15, 1974.68   
B.  Buckley v. Valeo69 
Shortly after the FECA Amendments went into effect, Senator James Buckley, 
among others, filed suit against Francis R. Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate, in a 
case that became known as Buckley v. Valeo.70  The complainants sought a 
declaratory judgment that the FECA Amendments were unconstitutional and an 
injunction against enforcement of those provisions.71  The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia recognized the government’s “clear and 
compelling interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the 
undue influence of wealth,” stating that “[b]oth the reality and appearance of 
electoral corruption justify Congressional intervention.”72   
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that individual contribution limits, the 
disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme were 
constitutional; however, the limitations on candidate expenditures were not 
constitutional.73  In its discussion, the Supreme Court focused on the complainant’s 
First Amendment argument and characterized campaign contributions as free 
speech: 
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his 
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The 
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with 
the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution 
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the 
candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate 
or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political 
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a 
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss 
candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if 
spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the 
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone 
other than the contributor.74 
Even though the Court recognized that individual campaign contributions and 
expenditures were a recognized form of constitutionally protected speech, the 
Court held that the $1,000 individual contribution limit was constitutionally 
justified.75  In so holding, the Court weighed a person’s First Amendment right 
                                                                                                     
 67. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 68. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. 93–443, Oct. 15, 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. 
 69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 70. Id. at 7-9. 
 71. Id. at 8-9. 
 72. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 96 
S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), and modified, 532 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 73. 424 U.S. at 143. 
 74. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). 
 75. Id. 
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with the primary purpose of the Act, to limit corruption.76  Although the Court 
determined that the limit regulated speech,77 the limit did not affect a person’s 
ability to “engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through 
volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial 
extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.”78  In 
determining that the individual contribution limit was justified, the Court addressed 
the possibility of corruption: “of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid 
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from 
public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions.”79  According to the Court, the great interest in 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption justified limiting a person’s 
political contribution to an individual candidate or committee.80 
However, there were several shortcomings in FECA.81  The Court’s 
determination that expenditure limitations were unconstitutional allowed campaign 
costs to rise.82  In the mid-1990s, political parties began using soft money more 
frequently.83  Money donated in violation of campaign finance law is considered 
soft money.84  Soft money contributions are often large donations by corporations, 
unions, or individuals to a political party who in turn use the donation for “party 
building purposes.”85  Soft money, often used for grass-roots activities, includes 
money spent on printing campaign materials, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter 
registration.86  Soft money spending grew from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million 
in 2000.87  “This unlimited party spending permitted corporations, unions, 
individuals, and other interested entities to evade contribution limits by channeling 
money through political parties, potentially leading to a quid pro quo.”88 
C.  The Slow Decline of Campaign Finance Restrictions 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) amended FECA.89  
This law was the result of a six-year political struggle and “is the most significant 
                                                                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the 
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”). 
 78. Id. at 28. 
 79. Id. at 27. 
 80. Id. at 28. 
 81. See generally 148 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. March 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-03-20/pdf/CREC-2002-03-20-senate.pdf. 
 82. See Simon, supra note 7, at 170 (“The invalidation of spending limits resulted in the 
unrestrained ability of campaign costs to rise, while money into campaigns continued to be subject to 
limits.”).  
 83. George Comeau, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 40 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 253, 260 (2003). 
 84. Simon, supra note 7, at 175. 
 85. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Comeau, supra note 83, at 253 n.58-59. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 259 (emphasis in the original). 
 89. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
172 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1 
change in federal campaign finance law” since FECA.90  Included in BCRA was a 
prohibition against soft money,91 an increase in the individual contribution 
limitations,92 and an increase in the aggregate limit on individual contributions.93  
Several suits challenging the Act’s constitutionality followed its passing.  These 
suits were combined into McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.94  In 
upholding the prohibition on soft money, the Supreme Court stated that this Act 
“does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and 
unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal 
candidates, and federal officeholders.”95   
The Court used a broad definition of corruption, worrying about the influence 
large sums of money might have on elections.96  The Court’s definition of 
corruption included improper influence and opportunities for abuse, in addition to 
quid pro quo arrangements.97  Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, argued for a more narrow definition to include only quid pro quo corruption.  
In Justice Kennedy’s opinion, “only a single definition of corruption has been 
found to identify political corruption successfully and to distinguish good political 
responsiveness from bad—that is quid pro quo.”98  Justices Stevens and O’Connor 
wrote for the majority regarding Titles I (regulating the use of soft money) and II 
(prohibiting corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for 
communications that are intended to influence federal election outcomes).  The 
opinion stated that Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of corruption was too narrow 
and would “render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally 
dispiriting forms of corruption.”99  It is obvious throughout the McConnell opinion 
that the Supreme Court was split on the definition of corruption. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court heard a case challenging a Vermont campaign 
finance statute that regulated both the amount a candidate could spend on their 
campaign, and the amount individuals, organizations, and political parties could 
contribute to those campaigns.100  In Randall v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court held 
that both limitations were unconstitutional.101  In so holding, the Supreme Court 
explained that the Act burdened “First Amendment interests by threatening to 
inhibit effective advocacy by those who seek election, particularly challengers; its 
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contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in 
campaigns through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation.”102  
Further, the Court stated that the Act burdened speech disproportionately to serving 
the interests of prevention of actual or apparent corruption.103  This was the first 
time the Supreme Court struck down a campaign contribution limit. 
Then, in 2010, a nonprofit corporation, Citizens United, wished to sell a 
documentary critical of a candidate for the 2008 Presidential primary election they 
produced to a cable company for on-demand viewing; the promotion of the film 
would include two short ads for the film.104  Citizens United feared that the ads 
would qualify as an electioneering communication, defined as “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for 
Federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general 
election.”105  Fearing that the film and ads qualified as electioneering 
communication, Citizens United brought a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the FEC as a preemptive move to avoid civil and criminal penalties 
associated with the prohibition against electioneering communication.106  The suit 
alleged that section 203 of BCRA, prohibiting electioneering communication, was 
unconstitutional.107  In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that the First Amendment 
protection applies to corporations.108  The Government argued that corporate 
political speech should “be banned in order to prevent corruption or its 
appearance.”109  The Supreme Court, citing Buckley, held that “‘the interest in 
preventing corruption . . . [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] on independent 
expenditures.’”110  Suggesting it would be impossible to use these types of 
expenditures for quid pro quo corruption, the Court held “that independent 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.”111  The Court turned toward a narrow definition 
of corruption, which included only quid pro quo corruption, believing that the 
broader definition (including the appearance of influence or access) would not 
cause voters to lose faith in the democracy.112  The Supreme Court held that the 
federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering 
communications violated the First Amendment, overruling McConnell.113 
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III.  THE MCCUTCHEON DECISION 
A.  Factual Background 
As previously stated, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in 
2002.  Although focused on eliminating soft money, BCRA increased the 
contribution limitations from FECA in order to account for inflation.114  BCRA 
allowed “an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election per candidate . . .; 
$32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a state or local 
party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political action committee.”115  
Additionally, for the 2013-2014 election cycle, the BCRA provided aggregate 
limits: an individual could contribute $48,600 to federal candidates for office and 
$74,600 to other political committees.116  In total, an individual could donate 
$123,200 to candidates and non-candidate committees in a two-year election 
cycle.117 
During the 2011-2012 election cycle, Shaun McCutcheon contributed a total of 
over $33,000 to sixteen different federal candidates, complying with the base 
requirements for each candidate.118  McCutcheon wished to contribute to more 
candidates but was unable to do so because of the aggregate limits of BCRA.119  
Additionally, McCutcheon alleged that he wished to increase his donation even 
more during the 2013-2014 election cycle, but would be prevented from doing so 
under BCRA and FECA.120  Co-appellant, the Republican National Committee 
(RNC), wished to receive contributions by McCutcheon and other similarly 
situated people, but was unable to do so because of the aggregate limits on 
contributions to political committees.121   
B.  Procedural History 
In accordance with BCRA § 403(a)(1), McCutcheon and the RNC filed a 
complaint before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.122  McCutcheon and the RNC claimed that the aggregate 
limits on contributions to individuals and committees were unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment, and sought to enjoin the enforcement of such limits.123  In 
response, the Government moved to dismiss the case.124  The District Court denied 
the preliminary injunction and granted the Government’s request for dismissal.125  
In so holding, the District Court stated that the limits were “valid expressions of the 
government’s anti-corruption interest” and that the “aggregate limits . . . prevent 
                                                                                                     
 114. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1) (West 2002). 
 115. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1443. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 142 (D.D.C. 2012). 
2014] MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 175 
evasion of the base limits.”126  McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court.127  
C.  Arguments and Decision of the Court 
Appellants argued that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions 
restricted their First Amendment right to free speech.128  Appellants challenged the 
“distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not consider,” specifically the over-
breadth challenge of the aggregate limits.129  The Government argued that 
aggregate limits prevent the circumvention of individual limits thus serving the 
Government’s legitimate interest in combating political corruption.130  To support 
its position, the Government offered several scenarios demonstrating how the 
aggregate limits further their anti-circumvention interest.131  First, the Government 
argued, “there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is given to a 
legislator, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be 
appropriately divided among numerous candidates and committees.”132  The 
Government further argued that the solicitation of large contributions posed a 
danger for corruption.133 
The Court held that the aggregate limits do little to combat political corruption 
and instead, extremely restrict an individual’s right to participate in the democratic 
process.134  The Court began by stating, “any regulation must . . . target what we 
have called quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.”135  Though the Court 
recognized the strong interest the Government has in combating corruption and its 
appearance, the Court explained that the interest must be limited to a certain type of 
corruption “in order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect 
of restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall govern 
them.”136  The Court took issue with the dissent’s broad interpretation of 
corruption, stating that the dissent “dangerously broadens the circumscribed 
definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases, and targets as 
corruption the general, broad-based support of a political party.”137  The Court 
believed that “the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may 
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard 
basic First Amendment rights.”138 
In addressing the Government’s concern about circumvention,139 the Court 
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believed that “the improbability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits 
instead further the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money 
in political campaigns.”140  Further, the Court found the Government’s and 
dissent’s examples of circumvention to be implausible.  Instead of an aggregate 
limit to prevent circumvention of individual limits, the Court believed that other 
options would be more effective, including “restricting transfers . . . to require 
contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated, 
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients.”141   
Filing a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas recommended overturning 
Buckley, stating that the Court’s decision in Buckley “denigrates core First 
Amendment speech.”142  He argued that the bifurcated standard of review for 
contributions and expenditures outlined in Buckley, requiring a lesser standard of 
review for contributions, failed to withstand careful review.143  Thomas argued that 
although the Court believed contributions were different in kind from expenditures, 
both usually have some intermediary between the one contributing money and the 
message, or the one spending the money to produce the message.144  Thomas 
continued his concurrence by stating that the “remaining justifications Buckley 
provided are also flawed” and therefore should be overturned.145  Although Justice 
Thomas did not explicitly address corruption in his concurrence, he did state that he 
is in full agreement that the “Government may not penalize an individual for 
robustly exercising his First Amendment rights.”146  It can be implied that Justice 
Thomas believes that corruption is not a strong enough justification to restrict a 
person’s First Amendment rights.   
In their dissent, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan took issue 
with the Court’s definition of corruption and advocated the importance of the 
aggregate contribution limit.  The dissent disagreed with the majority’s belief that 
the aggregate limits do not further a significant governmental interest because, 
according to the majority, given the individual limits, spending large amounts of 
money on elections does not rise to corruption.147  The dissent recognized that this 
belief was based on a “narrow definition of corruption that excludes efforts to 
obtain influence over or access to elected officials or political parties.”148  The 
dissent also disagreed with the majority’s belief that, because of the individual 
limits, the aggregate limits do not function meaningfully.149  The dissent found it 
impossible to reconcile the Court’s narrow definition of corruption in this case with 
the Court’s broad definition in McConnell, because the Court’s definition in this 
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case “excludes efforts to obtain influence over or access to elected officials or 
political parties.”150  The dissent stated that aside from the Court’s holding in 
Citizens United, case law has insisted upon a considerably broader definition of 
corruption than what the Court held here.151  Worried, the dissent wrote that: “[i]n 
the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and likely 
will find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candidates, 
producing precisely the kind of ‘corruption’ or ‘appearance of corruption’ that 
previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitutional.”152   
The dissent supported this view by providing three examples in which a donor 
could produce corruption in the absence of an aggregate limitation.  The first 
example provided that a person would be able to donate $1.2 million dollars over 
two years to a political party; with aggregate limits, this was previously only 
$74,600. 153  The dissent worried that without the aggregate cap, political parties 
would organize in a way to ensure the legality of this greater donation.154  For 
instance, each major political party has three national committees and fifty state 
committees; to ensure the ease of large donations, each party could form a “Joint 
Party Committee” and then allocate the large donations they receive accordingly.155  
The dissent feared that this action would breed the same corruption the Court has 
sought to avoid in the past: “elected officials . . . obliged to provide [the donor] 
special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legislative favor.”156   
The second example the dissent provided was the increase in donations to 
individual candidates.157  In a given election year, there are 435 House seats and 
thirty-three Senate seats open for election.158  Without the aggregate limit, an 
individual donor can now donate to their party’s candidate for every open seat; this 
would equate to an additional $2.4 million every two-year election cycle.159  This 
example combined with the previous example means that a wealthy individual 
could now contribute $3.6 million every two years to their political party and its 
candidates.160  The “Joint Party Committee” from the first example could now be 
expanded to include each of these individual candidates for office.161  The dissent 
feared that current law would allow these “Joint Party Committees” to shift these 
large donations to a single candidate.162  “[A] party could proliferate these joint 
entities,” carefully naming them to avoid earmarking rules.163  Then, these joint 
party committees could each write the same single candidate a check.164  Even 
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though the initial $3.6 million donation from a single donor has to be divided up 
according to limits placed on candidates and political parties, a loophole is created 
to allow those candidates and political parties to reroute that money to a single 
candidate.165  Thus, $2.37 million of the single donor’s $3.6 million donation could 
be rerouted to a single candidate.166  The dissent feared that this routing and 
rerouting routine would be explained to a donor in order to circumvent individual 
donation limitations, and the candidate receiving the donation would learn who the 
donor was—perhaps leading to the obligation of providing special access and 
influence to the donor.167 
Finally, the third example from the dissent provided that there would be a 
proliferation of political action committees.168  A rich donor could donate $10,000 
(over the course of two years) to 200 PACs created by party supporters.169  Nine 
other donors could do the same, bringing the total to $20,000 per PAC.170  Each 
PAC would have $100,000 and would then write 10 checks to the most embattled 
candidates for $10,000 each.171  If this were a concerted effort, each candidate 
would then get $2 million total.172  Although a candidate would not know who 
specifically donated the money they received from each PAC, they would likely 
know who the big ten donors were.173  According to the dissent, examples two and 
three exemplify the anti-circumvention argument in campaign finance without 
aggregate limits, while all three examples demonstrate the possibility for 
corruption, either through influence, special access, or quid pro quo.  
IV.  THE COURT’S DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION IN MCCUTCHEON IS TOO  
NARROWLY DRAWN AND SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE  
CIRCUMVENTION AND IMPROPER INFLUENCE 
In its opinion, the majority used the narrow definition of corruption, quid pro 
quo corruption or outright bribery, to determine that aggregate limits violate the 
First Amendment.174  The Court refused to consider the prevention of influence 
through donations and circumvention of other limits to be an adequate justification 
for regulation.175  The Government’s justification for the aggregate limits should 
have provided sufficient justification for the Court to uphold the aggregate limits.  
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court has very narrowly defined corruption to 
exclude circumvention and influence, Congress should pass a law expanding the 
definition of corruption to include these acts. 
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A.  The Government’s Justification for the Act was Correct 
The Supreme Court never reached the standard of review question because, 
according to the Court, there was a “substantial mismatch between the 
Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it.”176  However, 
the Government’s stated objective for the enactment of the BCRA (anti-corruption 
and anti-circumvention of campaign finance law) was achieved by the BCRA 
aggregate limits.  When President George Bush signed BCRA into law he stated 
that the Act: “will result in an election finance system that encourages greater 
individual participation, and provides the public more accurate and timely 
information, than does the present system.”177 
At the time FECA was passed, its justification was called into question as well.  
In Buckley, the Court held that FECA was justified by three governmental interests:  
[T]he prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the 
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' 
positions and on their actions if elected to office . . . mute[s] the voices of affluent 
persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative 
ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections, . . . [and] act as a brake on 
the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political 
system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of 
money.178 
Although the Court believed FECA was justified for all three of the above 
reasons, the Court stated that it was “unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary 
purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large 
individual financial contributions” to justify its constitutionality.179  Since Buckley, 
the Supreme Court has focused on that sole justification when balancing an act’s 
intrusion on a person’s First Amendment rights.   
In McCutcheon, the Court focused on the Government’s anti-circumvention 
and anti-corruption interests.180   Perhaps it was the fault of the Government to not 
raise one of the remaining justifications in Buckley.181  As mentioned above, one of 
the justifications raised in Buckley was to “mute the voices of affluent persons and 
groups . . . to equalize the ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of 
elections.”182  Although this justification, in terms of equalizing political 
participation, has been found to be insufficient by the Supreme Court since 
Buckley,183 this justification can also go to the broader definition of corruption: the 
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appearance of improper access.  Aggregate limits on campaign contributions 
prevent a person from donating more than $123,200 a year; without these limits, it 
is estimated that the new cap on aggregate donations by a single person could reach 
$3.5 million.184   
To put this in perspective, it is helpful to look at the numbers.  Just shy of 10 
million people in the United States have a net-worth of greater than $1 million 
dollars;185 however, the United States has a population of an estimated 316,128,839 
people.186  In the 2011-2012 election cycle, the Huffington Post found forty-nine 
donors to be well over the aggregate contribution limits, demonstrating that a few 
affluent people significantly contribute to elections.187  Without the aggregate 
limits, the appearance of elections being bought by a few wealthy individuals may 
cause people to believe their contribution has no effect on the outcome of an 
election, and thus lose interest in the democratic process.  The aggregate limits 
serve to prevent the appearance that a few wealthy individuals buy elections to 
influence policy or to benefit themselves, much like when individuals made 
significant donations to the Nixon campaign to later be appointed to an 
ambassadorship.   
B.  Corruption Should be Defined More Broadly Than Quid Pro Quo 
The Majority’s definition of corruption in McCutcheon only included quid pro 
quo corruption.  In its eyes, corruption is only corruption if a contributor gives 
money to a candidate in exchange for a vote or other favor (or the appearance that a 
contributor gave money to a candidate in exchange for a vote or other favor).  Quid 
pro quo: “where, say, a donor gives money with the understanding that the 
politician will do a specific thing in return.”188  An example of quid pro quo 
corruption is a California state senator who accepted $100,000 in bribes from 
undercover FBI agents posing as Hollywood movie executives in exchange for 
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directing legislation in their favor.189  
The dissent argued for a broader definition, including the appearance of 
influence, which could result in a cynical public who, in turn, loses interest in 
political participation altogether.190  Relying on the dissent in McConnell, the 
McCutcheon dissenters argued that the Court’s definition of corruption would 
exclude “influence over or access to elected officials, because generic favoritism or 
influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses.”191   An 
example of this broader definition of corruption is a mayor who accepted bribes 
from businessmen “in exchange for access to city officials responsible for planning, 
zoning and permitting.”192 
Empirical studies suggest the McCutcheon dissent might be right.  According 
to one study, even if quid pro quos were not to occur, money could still bias a 
candidate’s policy choices.193  For example, fundraising considerations may weigh 
on the minds of candidates, leading them to vote a certain way or support specific 
legislation.194  Over time, candidates would be “subject to many pressures to 
behave in ways that may hide their true beliefs.”195  Another study found that 
Congressional members meet more frequently with donors than non-donors.196  
That study concluded that those who can afford to contribute to campaigns have a 
higher likelihood of commanding greater attention from influential 
policymakers.197  Although the study did not address why influential policymakers 
were more likely to meet with large campaign contributors, the conclusions display 
the influence campaign contributors can have on Congressional candidates.198 
Corruption is broader than quid pro quo corruption and in the past the Supreme 
Court has recognized this.  However, with the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, the 
Court continues to employ a definition that is too narrow and excludes the 
corruption Congress meant to protect elections against.  If the Court refuses to 
recognize the capacity of potential corruption in politics, Congress should act to 
create a statute defining corruption in a broader scope. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
“We all know that money is the chief source of corruption.”199  “We all know 
that large contributions to political campaigns . . . put the political party under 
obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation.”200  
With the Court’s holding in McCutcheon, the obligation that comes from a large 
contribution does not count as corruption.  In discussing the Court’s holding in 
McCutcheon, journalist Ari Berman wrote, “under the leadership of Chief Justice 
John Roberts, the Supreme Court has made it far easier to buy an election and far 
harder to vote in one.”201  Before the Supreme Court ruled on McCutcheon, the 
Washington Post predicted the future of campaign finances should the aggregate 
limits be struck down.202  The predictions included wealthy donors having a greater 
influence, an increase in size and power for joint fundraising committees, and the 
eventual demise of individual limits.203  While McCutcheon does not eliminate 
campaign finance regulation, it is an obvious step in that direction.  The U.S. 
Congress should act and pass a law to overturn the Supreme Court’s troubling 
narrow quid pro quo definition of corruption to protect the anti-corruption interest 
in American democracy. 
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